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1. Introduction.
Employee ownership constitutes an important element in the ownership structure of
enterprises in many transition economies. This is also the case for the thr e Baltic
Countries (see Mygind, 1996b). It is a widespread assumption among Western
economists that this type of ownership will have an economic efficiency inferior to
that of other types of private enterprises (Lipton & Sachs 1990, Hind 90, Boycko
et al. 1993). Thus, when privatization results in employee-owned enterprises it is
assumed only to be a "halfway" privatization which still maintains important
elements of the old inefficient system. While this assumption may to a certain extent
be true, such conclusions are rooted in theoretical models based on quite narrow
assumptions. The empirical foundation is even weaker. The latest xample is chapter
8 about "Ownership, governance and restructuring" in the influential "Transition
report" from the EBRD. The empirical results are not clear. In fact, part of the results
points to better performance of insider owned enterprises compared to outside
owned enterprises. In spite of this and in spite of some moderations the chapter
concludes (p.137):
"Third, there is some suggestive evidence that effective corporate governance is
necessary to deliver "deeper restructuring", and particularly new capital
investment. It seems that more such restructuring may have been undertaken by
firms with concentrated outside ownership, especially those owned by foreign
investors and, to a smaller extent, firms controlled by investment funds or banks".
This is not to criticize the conclusion that foreign-owned enterprises have a higher
level of investment. Indeed, this is also confirmed by our study and is one of the least
surprising results. However, this conclusion suggests that "deep restructuring"
depends on foreign ownership which in most of the economies in transition only can
dominate a small share of the economy.
Most of the analyses made of the economic performance for different ownership
types in Eastern Europe are based on a limited number of enterprises and a very
short and very unstable period. The level of analysis is very imple. The conclusions
in the EBRD report are mainly based on the average percent of change for different
owner groups of enterprises. In this respect, our data-material are relative large and
2detailed, and we are able to perform a multi-variable analysis that should bring more
reliable results. However, at this point in our analysis, it is still necessary to point out
that the results are preliminary. Further analysis is needed and more reliable results
can be found as additional annual figures are included in the analysis.
2. Method.
The structure of this paper is illustrated in figure 2. Initially, the focus will be a
discussion of the theoretical predictions for the performance of different forms o
ownership in the special transitional context. To do this it is necessary to point out
the special assumptions not only concerning the specific types of ownership, but also
the special institutional framework characterizing transition economies and the
specific situation of the producti n system etc. From these basic assumptions a row
of basic problems concerning corporate governance of specific types of ownership
can be found and from these probl ms more specific predictions about the behavior
can be given. However, in many cases there will be factors pointing in opposite
directions making the theoretical predictions unclear. These predictions or open
questions are then confronted with some of our preliminary results of the empirical
analysis (Jones & Mygind, 1996 and Uldall, 1996). 
Figure 2. Overview over the article.
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3. Basic assumptions.
To structure the analysis the framework introduced in Mygind, 1994 will be used.
Here, a model with four sub-systems were developed for an analysis at the level of
society. However, the model may aso provide an overview over the situation at the
enterprise-level as illustrated in figure 3.1.
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Includes different social groups or stakeholders in the social system of the enterprise.
For the purpose of this analysis managers, other mployees (or here just employees)
will make up these groups. Managers or employees have a stake in the enterprise
because their working conditi s and salary are determined by the enterprise. They
might also have a stake as owners like outsiders such as the state, domestic capital
and foreign capital. Included in the analysis will also be banks as suppliers of capital.
However, suppliers and consumers will not be included as stakeholders in th
current analysis. The power of the different groups in relation to the enterprise are
determined by their ownership rights, their share of the information about the
enterprise, and the importance of  the resources they supply, eg. management skills
or capital, to the enterprise.
Their behavior depends both on their formal role in the enterprise and on their
objectives based on the value system - the culture of different participants. These
objectives are different for the various stakeholders and this makes the behavior of
the enterprise dependent on who has the ownership control of the enterprise. 
If the individualistic culture is dominant, the main objectives of the employees is
employment and wage. The wealth, i.e the profitability of the enterprise, might have
some influence on them if they are owners. However, in the special conditions of
4transition the capital markets are far from perfect and the employees might be
imposed to a liquidity constraint so that they have to give higher priority to a
minimum level of wages compared to an incre se in profits for the enterprise. It can
be assumed that for the managers this constraint is not so tough, and when the
banking system starts functioning they will often be in a better position to get loans
than the rest of the employees. For outside owners it is assumed that profit (wealth)
maximization for the enterprises is the only objective.
The institutional system shows the formal structure of the enterprise. In this context
we will focus at the ownership structure (although connected t  this the organization
structure in a broader sense could also be included). We will here distinguish
between the following ownership types dependent on who is the dominating owner:
Figure 3.2 Different ownership types.
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The figure illustrates the 6 different ownership-types to be analyzed. It is assumed
that the formal distribution of especially the ownership right to cont ol can vary from
the real distribution of controlling power. This is assumed to be the case in the state
owned enterprise in the transition economy. The economy is liberalized giving scope
for the management in the state owned enterprise to make decisions about pricing,
buying and selling goods etc. At the same time the enterprise is still state owned.
The actual possibilities of the managers might be so large that they in fact can
recover part of the surplus, marked by (0) for the right to surplus in figure 3.2.  
In the employee-owned enterprise the employees are assumed to have de facto
control with management. Still, the manager retains his share of t e ownership rights
as an ordinary employee. In the management controlled employee-owned enterprise
the managers have the real control and the control of other employees is limited
accordingly (Earle & Estrin, 1995 also use this distinction). The manager also has
5a share of the right to surplus and wealth, but assuming an equal distribution in a
large enterprise his part will be only a fraction of the total.
In the pure form of management ownership the manager simply has all the three
ownership rights.
In the outside-owned enterprise with diversified ownership, the manager can also
exert a high degree of real control. This is especially the case during the transition
with capital markets, accounting and financial information systems in a very
preliminary stage. This means that the threat of take-over and external monitoring
through the capital-markets will be quite limited. In this situation the power of the
manager versus the outside owners will be even strong r than in a similar ownership
type in the developed markets in the West.
This picture changes when the outside ownership is concentrated with a core-owner.
This is typically the case for foreign ownership also showed in the figure.
In the empirical analysis we cannot directly distinguish between whether th
enterprise is management controlled. Still, it is relevant to make the distinction in the
theoretical analysis because it has important implications on the behavioral
predictions. In the empirical analysis we can then argue that some specific results
point in the direction of factual management control.
Closely connected to the real distribution of control is the question about the flow
of information to the different groups involved in the enterprise. This is also
illustrated in figure 3.2. We assume that there is asymmetric information so that the
managers have some essential information about the activities of the enterprise
which is costly or impossible for the outsiders to get. In the case of outside core
ownership it is assumed that the outside owners use much resources to get
information and to monitor management. Thus the core-owner has quite good access
to information from the management. The other employ es have also access to most
of this information, and this is especially considered to be the case in the situation
of pure employee ownership with more transparent decision-making and where the
employees can change the management if they do not feel they are well enough
informed.
Note, that in our ownership categories we do not distinguish between privatized
enterprises and enterprises started from scratch - so called "de novo" enterprises.
Such a division might be relevant and is used e.g. by EBRD (1995) and Earle et al.
(1995). The problem is that de novo enterprises are very difficult to distinguish from
6privatized enterprises. Nearly all enterprises in fact start up by taking over some of
the assets from a former state-owned enterprise and many of the de novo enterprises
are, in fact, spin-offs from former state enterprises. It is also a problem to use the
legal form of the company to distinguish start-ups because most of the enterprises
which by name and legal form looks like de novo enterprises are very often created
as a legal entity to lease the assets from a former state-owned enterprise. Real de
novo enterprises are concentrated in sectors which were underdeveloped in the
command economy, i.e. restaurants, retail trade, import export and liberal services.
In our empirical estimates, the effect of ownership will thus be very difficult to
distinguish from the effect of branch.
 
The production system in the typical transitional enterprise is under strong pressure
to be restructured. In the command economy the system was adjusted to fulfil the
directives of the plan. After liberalization, the price structure and the motivation
structure changes dramatically. This most often means that the enterprise will have
to change both products and production methods to follow the demand and cost
signals of the market. To undertake such a restructuring, both mana ement skills and
large investments are necessary. Restructuring takes time and for virtually all
enterprises as well as the whole econ my results in a steep fall in production before
the new products and the new markets are developed and production starts to grow
again. Except for a few "golden egg" - enterprises, this development means a J-
shaped curve for several of the variables measuring economic p rf rmance: sales,
employment, profit etc. and resources for investments will be a crucial factor for the
speed of the "deep restructuring" in most enterprises.
Figure 3.1 also highlights some relations to the surrounding world. Some of these
relations in the specific transitional context is showed in figure 3.3. The corporate
governance structure is both determined by the ownership structure at the enterprise
level and the interaction with the external institutions. These institutions are all in a
transitional stage. 
The state is changing its role and its takes time to build up the necessary legislation
for private contracts, property rights, bankruptcy etc. and it takes even more time to
build up a legal framework to control and facilitate the functioning of the system.
For example, in most countries there is still not a functioning registration of
ownership rights for land and buildings. This has been delayed by the complex
process where the ownership structure from before the socialist take-over is sought
to be restituted. Before such a registration system is operational, it will be difficult
to develop a property market. It is also difficult to develop  the banking system
7because collateral in property is often necessary to give loans to enterprises.
The presure from the capital markets is very weak. In a developed economy this
takes the form of threats of hostile take-overs and the capital markets provides 
benchmark to the benefits of diversified shareholders. This applies pressure on
management to make more efficient use of the resources of the enterprise. 
In the transition economy, the banking system is not playing its potential role as
external monitor of the management. In the initial stage of transition it is because
many enterprises have accumulated substantial debts, most of which the banks
cannot expect will ever be paid back. In a normal banking system, bank pressure and
the threat of bankruptcy would discipline the enterprises.However, in many cases the
banks themselves are reluctant to take such measures because it would reveal that
the banks had actually accumulated excessive bad debts. Even when this problem
has been solved the common picture is that bank loans are very scarce nd expensive
and only used to a very limited extent by enterprises.
The pressure from competition from other enterprises increases with the progress of
liberalization. This pressure often develops into a squeeze for many enterprises
because of the steep fall in demand in the initial stages of transition.
In many economies, especially of the North European type, the conditions of
employees are effectively supported by unions and state-regulation. This is only to
a limited degree the case in most transition economies, Poland and perhaps Russia
being possible exceptions. In most other countries, unions have lost much of their
legitimacy because of their close links to the former command system.
A well functioning market for managers might discipline these managers to fulfil the
interests of the owners. Successful performance of the enterprise could be a strong
argument for the manager for increased salary or to get a new job in another
enterprise. However, the very "noisy" environment for all enterprises in the
economies of transition makes it difficul to evaluate the relation between enterprise
performance and quality of management, and the market for management skills are
at a very preliminary stage in Eastern Europe, Jones & Kato, 94.
Figure 3.3  Conditions for corporate governance in transitional economies.
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In this section it has been shown that the external pressure on the enterprise and on
the management is quite different from the situation in a developed market economy.
This makes it even more important how the owners can govern the managemen
more directly.
4. Governance problems and other basic problems.
Given these basic assumptions, each ownership structure will have some basic
problems - some of them connected to the corporate governance of the enterprise.
These problems can be divide  into agency-problems, problems when stakeholders
have dominating ownership at the expense of a minority owner, problems connected
to diversifcation of risk, problems of adjustment of the production process to the
9preferences of the participants, problems of adjustment of the ownership-structure
through a market for control, and distributional problems. Figure 4.1 provides an
overview.
The agency problems arise because of limited and asymmetrical infor ation coupled
with opportunism (as defined by Williamson, 1985). In the current analysis it
concerns three levels: between the owners and the manager, between banks and the
owners of the enterprise and between managers and employees. 
The first problem is usually called the "governance problem". This covers the
situation when the managers as the agent dominates the first ownership right, the
right to control, while the principal, the owners, have th rig t to surplus and wealth.
There is in other words a division between the person who makes the decisions and
the individuals who assume the risk. The manager have an interest in making
decisions bringing benefits to himself (income, status etc.) and these decisions are
not necessarily optimal seen from the point of view of the owners.
This is, in fact, one of the serious problems for state-owned enterprises. It was partly
present back in the command system, but is even more serious in the transitional
society. It is unclear who takes the responsibility for the state. Formally, the role as
owner is assigned to some level in the bureaucracy, but the bureaucrats themselves
do not risk their capital al hough they might risk some promotion in the hierarchy if
they do not fulfil their role. However, in the very unpredictable period of transition
it is extremely difficult to define what is an acceptable performance for an enterprise.
This makes the role of the state bureaucracy very complicated.
The state enterprise will often be put under some hardening of the budget constraint
simply because the overall state budget is under stress in the stabilization period.
This means that deficits at the enterprise level must be covered by the employees in
the form of reduced income. In this way the right to surplus or, more precisely, the
risk of loosing income is transferred to the group of employees. In this situation the
state-owned enterprise might have some similarities with especially the employee-
owned enterprise. This will typically be the management controlled type unless there
is a workers council with some rights for decision making.
 
Figure 4.1  Governance problems and other basic problems.
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The management controlled outside-owned enterprise might in this respect have
many similarities with the state-owned enterprise because lack of efficient capital
market institutions provides the diversified outside owner very low influence and a
very low level of reliable information about the enterprise. For a small shareholder
it is not profitable to use many resources for monitoring while the other shareholders
are "free riding". Also, the manager lacks a counterplayer - a real owner. Competi-
tion between different groups of managers inside a large enterprise and a well-
functioning market for managers might limit this problem. However, as noted earlier
this type of market is not very well developed in the societies in transition.
This form of counterplay arises in both the case of a strong external owner and in the
case of employee-ownership. In both cases the manager runs the risk of being fired
if some opportunistic behavior is recognized by the owners. In the case of an
external core-owner the decision-making process among the owners is not a problem
but the distance might imply a lack of information. However, when the core owner
has a large share in the company it is probably profitable to him to pay the cost for
quite intensive monitoring. In the case of employee ownership it might take both
time and effort to reach a majority decision to fire the manager. On the other hand,
the employees would probably have relatively easy and low cost access to
information about the performance and potential of the enterprise.
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In the management-owned enterprise this problem disappears.
The relation between the bank as the principal giving a loan to the agent, the owner,
is important for the enterprise to finance investment for restruc uring. From the point
of view of the bank it is important to have a secur  collateral, reliable information
and predictable behavior of the enterprise. As noted in the basic assumptions, the
employee-owned enterprise can be expected to giv a higher priority to employment
and wage than to profit. Combined with the transitional problem of lack of collateral
and low quality of accounting information this increases the agency problems in
relation to the bank and is thus a serious problem for the employee-owned enterprise
(Nuti, 1995 p. 13). The core of the problem is that the governance is exercised by
a factor of production other than capital. Therefore, an external supplier of debt (or
equity without control, see later) risk that the main goal is not to maintain and pay
the inputs of capital but the inputs of labor (Earle & Estrin, 1995, p. 9). 
In the case of management-controlled emp oyee ownership the relation to the banks
might be softened somewhat, but still the existence of the governance problem might
imply that the banks can have a well grounded fear that the manager will prefer a
higher riskprofile for the enterprise than desired by the suppliers of capital. This
argument also covers the case of dispersed outside ownership.
In the case of management ownership where the manager himself runs the risk of
loosing capital the banks can feel mor  secure. This is also the situation in the core-
owner case. The relation to the state-owned enterprise is also not so problematic
from the point of view of the bank if the state guarantees the loans. However, we
have also seen hard budget constraints being imposed on state-owned enterprises.
In this situation the state-owned enterprise can be compared to the other manage-
ment controlled cases.
The third principal agent problem concerns the relation between the manager
representing the owner and the employees. This is the classical conflict between
capital and labor. The workers get a fixed wage and the capital gets the residual
surplus of the activities. Given the level of employment and intensi y of work, higher
wages means lower profits. The employees as the agents have an interest in
supplying less effort than the principal has contracted for. Under the assumption of
limited and asymmetrical information the solution to this problem is simply that the
employees get the right to the residual. The problem disappears with full employee
ownership and it is strongly limited in the case of managerial control.
The problem between dominating stakeholders and minority shareholders has
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recently been stressed by Nuti (1995). The problem arises when a group of
stakeholder has the control of the company and when they have an incentive in
fulfilling their interests as stakeholders on the expense of their own interests as
shareholders but also on the expense of th  minority group of shareholders. If, as an
example, a large group of employees controls the company they will benefit more
by using the residual as payment for their own stakes in the form of an addition to
the wage and/or to level of employment than would have prevailed in another
system. These extra costs are taken from profits and thus from the income of all
shareholders. If their proportion of  employees is higher than their proportion of
shareholders, or using Nuti's term, if they own less than a "balanced share", they will
earn more as stakeholders as they lose as shareholders by such a transaction. Nuti's
solution is to claim that each employee with shares must hold a share at least as high
as his share in the total wage bill (Nuti, 1995, p. 15).
If the earlier described governance problem is taken to its extreme it can be
interpreted as a special case of the stakeholder-shareholder problem. Assume that
the manager has full control, but no ownership. Then he can simply transfer the
residual to a rise in h s own salary. However, in most cases even when the position
of shareholders is quite weak they decide the salary of the manager
In the case where the manager owns the majority of shares and there is a consider-
able minority shareholding, he might in principle have an interest in transferring
values to his own personal property or another enterprise owned completely by
himself. In some types of wild privatizations, managers have transferred the values
of the state owned enterprise to another company owned by themselves. 
For the core outside-owned enterprise there might also be special stakeholder
interests for the majority shareholder. For instance, the majority owner may be a
company supplying essential inputs to the enterprise in question. By transfer pricing,
the surplus of the enterprise can be acquired by the majority owner at the expense
of the minority group. (Nuti 1995 p. 12 indicates that this problem is solved by the
possibility of mergers; but why should this happen if the majority owner has an
interest in exploiting the minority?). Therefore, all ownership forms may have a
stakeholder-shareholder problem. However, it can be considered to be most serious
in the case of employee-ownership.
When managers and other employees own their company they have concentrated a
considerable risk. If the company fails they will not only lose their shares but also
their jobs, or as expressed by Meade (1972):"While property owners can spread
their risks by putting small bits of their property into a large number of concerns,
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a worker cannot put small bits of his effort into a large number of different jobs.
This presumably is a m in reason why we find risk-bearing capital hiring labour
rather than risk-bearing labour hiring capital". Such a concentration of risk implies
a high risk-premium and point in the direction of lower investment for insider
ownership. In the three other cases, the owners can diversify their risk over many
different enterprises. This means a lower risk premium and thus, ceteris paribus,
higher investment.
However, especially in the case of the manager-owned enterprise there is a factor
pointing in the other direction - a factor which is not included in the traditional
economic analysis. The manager reaches a higher degree of satisfaction on his
preferences if he himself makes the decisions concerning his workplace. He is
willing to pay a price for this in the form of higher effort and also typically in
accepting a higher degree of risk on his invested capital. In many cases the manager-
owned enterprise will accept a lower return on the investment compared to other
enterprises even if the risk is higher. 
For the remaining three types of ownership, the scope for the manager activities are
more narrow. However, the managers usually have the possibility of finding a job
in another enterprise if he is not satisfied with his conditions. Therefore, this is not
marked as an important problem on the figure.
A similar argument can be used for the employee-owned enterprise. Here it can be
connected to what could be coined “internal efficiency” (Mygind 1993). The idea
is that the activity inside the enterprise should be adjusted to the preferences of the
participants. Given the restrictions of the outside market, the employ es shall be able
to adjust their working conditions and the related income to their own preferences.
Again, this might result in increased effort and/or accept of lower remuneration.
However, there is a problem of defining the preferences for a group of employees,
especially if the group is very heterogenous. The solution preferred by the majority
might be different from the one preferred by minority groups. This might cause
conflicts (see the discussion below) and mean that internal efficiency is impossible
to achieve. Therefore, there is still a problem even in the employee-owned
enterprise. 
The privatization process includes a high degree of random events. The initial
distribution is given by the earlier system, and during the early stage of transition
with high inflation and many changes in relative incomes some people get rich
quickly while the majority have steeply falling real incomes. Different forms of
privatization favors different groups and the resulting distribution of ownership rights
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can be far from how that which a well functioning market would determine.
Therefore, it is important that the resulting ownership structure can continue an
adjustment process in the long run. To secure such an adjustment there must be a
market for ownership.
The discussed ownership structures do not all to the same extent facilitate such a
development. Continued state ownership does definitely not support such a develop-
ment; but these enterprises can still be privatized, and this opens up for an
adjustment in the future. The three insider-owned structures have some disadvan-
tages in this respect. In the case of management ownership, no adjustment will take
place as long as the owner do not want any changes and the enterprise is not
declared bankrupt. This could mean many years with sub-optimal economic
performance. In the case of employee ownership limitations in the possibility of
trading employee-shares might also create barriers for developing a market for
control. If the insiders have a large majority, outsiders might be discouraged in
buying shares because of the risk connected to the earlier discussed stakeholder-
shareholder problem. Hence, a majority takeover is a more likely scenario. The
question is, however, if the employees are interested in selling heir shares unless the
company is in financi l trouble. Without a functioning market for the shares owned
by employees it might also be difficult for an outsider to buy enough shares from the
insiders.
Trading shares is no problem in the diversified outside-owned cases. In the core-
owner case, the owner can postpone an adjustment of the ownership structure, and
also here the minority owner can stay away because of fear of the stakeholder-
shareholder problem. If the core owner owns shares in a higher proportion than his
stakes there is no problem. At the same time minority shareholders can free-ride on
the monitoring effort conducted by the core owner.
Employee ownership in the transitional economies is nearly always "individual"
ownership (Mygind, 1986). This means that the individual employee can sell his
share when leaving the enterprise and will experience a capital gain if the enterprise
has been successful. In most of the literature about employee ownership it is
assumed that there is "collective" type ownership. The control rights and right to
surplus are connected to each employee, but they cannot withdraw their capital when
they leave the company. Assuming that the employees pursue the objective of
maximizing their income (wage), then the theoretical predictions about the
collectively employee owned enterprise (Ward 1958, Domar 1966 and Vanek 1970)
shows an inefficient adjustment of supply in the short run and an inefficient
adjustment of investment in the long run. 
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These prediction do not cover the case of individual ownership. In this case the
objective of maximizing the average income can be transformed to an objective of
maximizing profits and the difference in behavior between the employee owned
enterprise and the outside owned "twin" disappears. (Mygind 1986and Sertel 1982).
However, this conclusion is based on the following conclusions which is not
completely fulfilled: Individual ownership, perfect capital market, the employees are
not risk averse and full employment. employees.
Because of the lack of a well functioning capital market and/or because of
restrictions in the tradeability of employee shares, lack of transparency, problems
with registration of ownership etc., it might be difficult for an employee to sell his
share and get a capital gain. In this respect, the situation looks more like the
collective type of ownership.
We assume that the ownership is distributed so that an employee receives the same
amount whether the surplus is paid as an addition to the wage or an increase in
profits. The assumption of indifference, however, also build on the condition that the
accumulated profit can be used as a collateral for a loan to the employee in a perfect
capital market. However, as already mentioned, capital markets remain imperfect
during transition. Therefore, the employee will not be indifferent and the typical
liquidity squeeze in the depressed transitional economy means a preference for cash
for most of the employees. Furthermore, the employees might be genuinely averse
to risk, i.e. not wanting to accumulate wealth in their enterprise. Again, this points
in the direction of elements of "Illyrian" behavior even for the individually-owned
enterprise, see the discussion about investment in section 5.
The distributional consequences of different ownership structures are also
summarized in figure 4.1. Continued state ownership fits to an objective of equality
because, at least formally, the state can decide about the wage for different groups
in the state owned enterprises. Similarly, with state ownership, the distribution of
wealth is quite equal. Employee-ownership provides a broader group of share-
owners in the population compared to the situation with only management and
outside ownership. However, a more equal distribution of share ownership can also
be the result of the broad population investi g their shares in investment fund which
then invest in the companies. This situation  make a more equal distribution for
outside core ownership compared to employee ownership.
The six different ownership structures have been treated as quite pure forms.
However, often more than one group will be owners. In most cases, one of thes
groups will be dominating, i.e. the actual control is in their hands. Nevertheless,
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other groups can have a considerable part of the ownership rights to surplus and
wealth. The problem of employee-dominated ownership with outsiders as minority
owners have already been discussed in relation to the stakeholder-shareholder issue.
Here we shall instead focus on the issue of insiders holding a minority share of the
ownership. This is relevant for the case of state ownership and especially for the
outside-owned cases.
Management minority shares could be an essential instrument for aligning the
incentives of managers to the preferences of the majority owners. This is exactly the
case for the widely used systems with stock opti ns and similar incentive systems
for managers in the West. In this way the principal-agent problem b tween managers
and owners can be partly solved. In the same way the manager-employee problem
can be limited by minority shareholdings of the broad group of employees. This type
of non-controlling interest by employees in their own enterprises can encourage the
motivation of employees resulting in improved productivity, better labor relations,
more flexible workforce etc.(Nuti, 1995,p.13). This is why the diffusion of employee
ownership and other types of financial participation in the form of profit sharing is
encouraged in the European Union (Uvalic, 1991).
5. Ownership and economic performance.
Now the anlysis may proceed from the basic problems of each ownership form to
predictions about the economic behavior. The main elements in this analysis are
illustrated in figure 5.1. The background elements are showed to the left and the
elements to measure in the empirical analysis are showed to the right. 
Fig 5.1 Overview over factors behind ownership and economic performance.
Privatization method Starting conditions
size, branch, market conditions
economic performance
quality and value of assets, debt,
adjustment of ownership ownership type
market for control
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
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motivation of employees
X-efficiency, flexibility
agency-problems
mutual monitoring/free rider
sales cost
employ-
ment
restructuring
dependent on: value added per factor input
quality of management
objectives, risk aversion 
access to capital
productivity
wage profit inter- tax
WxL est
finance
bank loans
internal (from profits)
internal capital emissions
external capital emissions
Investment profitability
Capital- total assets
structure    equity
debt/total assets
bankloans/debt
The privatization methods together with the initial conditions for each enterprise
determines the specific ownership type after privatization. This then determines
which of the six mentioned ownership structures will be chosen including the cases
where one of the forms are dominating with other owners holding minority shares.
For the cases with employee-ownership, we will in general assume that the
individual type where the employees can sell their shares at the market price when
they leave the enterprise. This need not be the case, however, insofar as limited
tradeability and diversions from the market price can change the ownership type
more in the direction of collective ownership, thus making the Illyrian theoretical
predictions relevant. Adjustment of the ownership structure might later change the
ownership type. This must be included in the analysis. Also, the possibility of
adjustment itself includes predictions about the behavior especially concerning the
capital structure and the possibility of access to capital, see later.
The ownership structure has implications for the main elements of the economic
behavior - the motiva ion of employees and the ability to restructure. The access to
finance can be included under the ability to restructure although it is illustrated
separately in figure 5.1. The motivation of the employees is important for how the
human resources, human capital, can be used by differ nt ownership types. In figure
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5.1 this is illustrated by the arrow from the motivation box to the economic
performance measure for productivity. The restructuring ability determines how
successful production can be changed and marketed so that sales start to increase
again. It also includes the ability to minimize costs and adjust employment. This can
be seen in the effects on productivity. Access to finance is an important element
determining the potential for investment in the enterprise.
The arrow from the starting conditions to the box of economic performance must
also be noted. Good economic performance can both be explained by favorabl
starting conditions and by the economic behavior connected to the specific
ownership type. In the empirical analysis it will be essential to try to separate these
elements. However, it turns out to be very difficult because the economic measures
for the value of the enterprise in the early stages of transition were of a very low
quality. This is because the price system had not started to operate appropriately.
The estimated value of the enterprise played a big role in the privatization process
to fix the price for the take-over. Often a nomi al historically based price with some
indexation was used to determine what the new owners should pay. This price would
very often have no relation to the real earning potential of the assets. Instead, the
measured economic performance after liberalization of prices, .e. different measures
for productivity and profitability might be the most appropriate measures for whether
the enterprise was initially a "golden or rotten egg".
Instead of such measures, reference to the privatization process as described in
Mygind(1996b) will be utilized. The determining element is here the order and the
conditions given for different potential ownership groups for selection of the
enterprises to be privatized. This is in fact the basic determinants used in figure 5.2.
Selection by insiders gives these types of ownership an initial advantage indicated
by "+". Especially, it should be remembered that managers with superior knowledge
will try to select the best for himself if this is possible. The leftovers in this process
will then later be sold perhaps through vouchers to outsiders, indicated by "-". Even
in this situation an external core owner, including foreigners, can only be expected
to be interested if they evaluate the object to be a potential profitable investment -
indicated by "0" in the figure.
The starting conditions can also be considered to be negative for the insiders if they
are effectively closed out in the first stage of privatization and enterprises are mainly
sold for cash from the highest bidder as was the case in Hungary and East Germany.
In these case, outside core owners had the best position to select the "cream of the
crop" of assets. If there were no external buyers, insiders could buy the “leftovers”
at a lower price often as an alternative to a close down. However, to the extent that
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managers had the possibility they mig t take over the best of these and only include
the rest of the employees if necessary for getting enough capital. Therefore,
management ownership is indicated by 0.
In both cases it is assumed that the state-owned enterprises are leftovers from the
privatization indicating quite bad starting conditions for our analysis of economic
performance. However, there might be cases where enterprises considered to be of
strategical importance for the country are kept under state ownership. Such case
could include "golden eggs" but in the overall quantitative picture they are
considered not to be of importance.
The motivation of employees are considered to be closely related to the earlier
discussed basic problems - the agency problem between manager a d employee (the
capital/labour conflict) and the question concerning the adjustment of the production
process to the preferences of the employees. In these respects it is considered that
employee-ownership has a strong advantage marked by "++" on figure 5.2. The
management controlled employee-owned enterprise has a "+" because the employees
stil get the surplus, but the production process cannot be expected to be planned
according to their preferences to the same extent as in the former case.
In the theoretical literature, however, the conclusions are not so clear. Some authors
including Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that this type of ownership lacks an
owner to monitor the efforts of the employees. The incentives for each employee will
be low especially in large enterprises wher  his return of an extra effort only will be
1/N with N as the number of employees. In this case, there will be a tendency of
free-riding on the efforts of other employees. However, the employees' dir ct inter st
in the performance of the enterprise gives a strong incentive for mutual monitoring.
Most empirical results point in the direction that employee owned enterprise, e.g. in
Mondragon (Thomas and Logan, 1982), can cut down on the number of middle level
monitors because of this mutual monitoring. Against the efficiency of employee
ownership Hansmann (1988) has argued that for a heterogenous group of employees
it will be difficult and involves conflicts to reach decisions about the management
of the enterprise. This indicates that the internal efficiency might not be so high for
some of the minority groups among the employees. However, it can not be expected
to be lower than in the other types of ownership where decisions concerning working
conditions etc. are taken by a manager which cannot be elected or dismissed by the
employees. On the other hand, the efficiency of the decision-making process might
be quite low and time-consumi g if attempts are made to try to include all workers.
The literature on the empirical evidence from the West concerning motivation of
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employees and indicators of productivity in employee-owned firms shows reductions
in working days lost through strikes, reduced labor turnover, increased employe
commitment to the firm etc. (Kruse & Weitzman, 1990, Bartlett et al. 1991, Bonin,
Jones & Putterman (1993).
The question about motivation of the employ  is closely connected to the ability of
the enterprise to implement the necessary restructuring. As described in section 3
nearly all enterprises, except newly established green field enterprises, would have
to change both the composition of output and production methods to find the
profitable activities measured by the market determined prices. Restructuring can
according to EBRD (1995, ch.8) be divided into 1) reactive restructuring with
adjustment to the steep fall in demand 2) pro-active  restructuring - building up new
market especially in foreign countries, and 3) deep restructuring - changing the
production process through new investments. Since it is impossible to distinguish
between the first two types, the short term restructuring for adjustment of sales and
employment and long term restructuring or deep restructuring for investments will
only be utilized here.
It is also very problematic to use averages for a given year for declines in employ-
ment and use this as an indicator for the necessary restructuring since included
enterprises might be at different levels in their restructuring process - different points
on the U-shaped curve for sales and employment.
The main questions concerning restructuring in enterprises with different types of
ownership are 1) Do they have an efficient management system which can find and
implement the best solutions seen from the point of view of the owners. 2) Do the
objectives of the owners support this restructuring? 3) Does the enterprise hav
access to the necessary capital for deep restructuring? These questions are included
in figure 5.1. In figure 5.2 the answers for the different types of ownership are spread
on different measures: Quality of management, employment and wage, and finance.
The quality of management is very difficult to predict on a theoretical level. On
questions concerns whether there is a mechanism to dismiss unqualified managers.
This mechanism is expected to be quite weak in the cases where managers are in
control of the ent rprise. These are the cases with the earlier described governance
problems and the case of managerial ownership. Only in the case of employe
ownership and outside core ownership can there be expected to be an effective
counterplayer towards management.
The quality of management also concerns the decision-making process inside the
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enterprise. If this process is dominated by conflicts between different groups of
employees as suggested by Hansmann (1988), there will be a low quality of
management, marked by "-" in figure 5.2. If, on the other hand, the decision-making
process is organized to balance the interests of diff rent groups and they support the
strategy of the enterprise, there will be a high quality of management. If the
employees feel that the goals of the enterprise are in accordance with their interests
of long-term employment relations etc. they will be more motivated to join the
restructuring efforts and to put their accumulated experience and firm-specific
knowledge to good use . This type of relationship is most likely to develop when the
control of the company is not dominated by the manager. 
When the broad group of employees controls management, their qualification for
doing this is important. The question is if there are groups among the employees
which have enough qualifications to hire management with solid qualifications. It
shall also be noted that the low tradeability of employee-owned shares makes the
external monitoring over the capital market even smaller in the employee-owned
enterprise than in the other privately owned types. 
Figure 5.2. Economic performance under different ownership structures.
SO EO MCEO MO MCOO OO/FO
starting conditions
selection by insiders
selection by outsiders 
 -  +  +  ++  -  0
 -  -  -  0  +  ++
employee motivation  -  ++  +  -  -  -
quality of management
shifting management
 -  +-  0-  +0  +-  +
 -  +  -  -  -  +
sales
(develop markets)  -  +  +  +  +   ++
  
adjusting employment 
incl. unemployment  cost
 0  -  0  +  +   ++
 +  ++  0  -  -  --
productivity
  -  ?  +  +  0  ++
wage flexibility  0  ++  +  0  -  -
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profitability
 -  +0  +  +  -  +
finance
internal from profits
internal emissions
from banks
external min. emissions
external maj. emissions
    
 -  +0  +  +  -  0
 -  +  +0  +0  +0  +0
 -  -  0  +  +  +
 -*  --  -  -  +  +
 + priv.  -  -  -  +  +
investment
objectives
access to capital
 -  0  +  +  +  ++
 -  -  -  0  +  ++
 
++ very high, + high, 0 neutral, - low, -- very low. 
Because of the governance problem the quality of management in the state-owned
enterprise is generally considered to be low. In the case of management ownership
it depends critically on the specific manager taking over the enterprise, but there
might be a tendency to a selection bias in a positive direction since the managers
who understand the new opportunities in the market economy are also be the ones
most likely to try to take over their own enterprise. This bias will probably not
rescue the outside-owned enterprise - therefore the more negative evaluation for this
type of ownership. In the case of the outside core-owner we expect the possibility
of selecting well qualified managers for the position.
Good or bad management and the motivation and flexibility of the workforce will
show up in the ability of the enterprise to estructure the combination of outputs and
get a positive development in sales. Thus, the level of sales per employee and the
increase in sales can be considered a measure of the success of this type of
restructuring. However, one qualification is in order. In the early stage of transition,
unbundling of unprofitable activities and thus a fall in sales might be necessary for
many enterprises. This may not be possible before the enterprise have been
privatized. 
In figure 5.2 it is assumed that state-owned enterprises will show the worst
performance concerning sales. Especially foreign-owned companies, which often
look to exploit the cheap labor costs for export or to develop the local market, are
expected to show the best performance of increasing sales. Note that the employee-
owned enterprise is not considered to have negative supply behavior in this area. We
only to a limited degree expect to find "Illyrian" behavior because, as earlier
explained, the ownership type has more individual than collective characteristics.
23
An important part of restructuring is to cut away some of labor hoarded as hidden
unemployment in many enterprises in the former command system. It also includes
taking away those parts of production which are not profitable. The risk of
unemployment and loss of firm specific human capital are included in the objective
function of the employees. Therefore, they will internalize this into the costs of
dismissing employees from the enterprise, and this will make the employee-owned
enterprise less willing to cut production and dismiss employees and restructuring will
almost inevitably be delayed. In the state-owned enterprise there will be some
political pressure and in the management-controlled employee-owned enterprise the
managers will probably also be under some pressure from employees not to cut
employment - therefore "0" for these cases. In the other cases it is assumed that
employment will be adjusted without much resistance from the employees because
they are in general in a weak position. Most radical restructuring on the employment
level will probably be the foreign-owned enterprises.
However, the adjustment of employment can also be viewed from another
perspective in a situation of high unemployment. Especially in certain areas with a
single firm dominating the local economy considerable lay-offs would be disastrous.
Although the reluctance of employees to dismiss their colleagues will postpone or
change the path of restructuring of the enterprise, it need not be taken as a negative
element in the economic behavior of employee ownership. On the contrary,
internalization of the costs of unemployment can for the whole society be taken as
a positive element. This is shown in figure 5.2 as the opposite tendency of the line
for restructuring employment.
A high level of productivity is a key element of the economic performance of the
enterprise because it includes many of the earlier mentioned variables.
As shown in figure 5.1 the results for productivity includes: the motivation of
employees and the quality of management are behind restructuring efforts and the
development in sales and cost minimization. This determines the value added of the
enterprise. Including again the effort of the employees and the level of employment
we get productivity - here both labor-productivity and total factor productivity are
considered.
If the employee-owned enterprise retains higher employment than the other
ownership forms it will have negative consequences for productivity. This type of
ownership had, on the other hand, a high score on employee motivation. The
employees can also be expected to b  interested in minimization of costs other than
labor cost and also in increasing sales. Therefore, the result depends on the relative
strength of opposing forces, indicated by "?" on figure 5.2. 
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The state-owned enterprise is expected to show quite negative results on productiv-
ity as a result of the both negative developments in the elements behind value added
and in employment. The remaining forms are expected to do fine with some
moderation for the diversified outside ownership where the results for the quality of
management counts in a negative direction. The outside core-owned enterprise,
especially if this covers foreign ownership, is expected through high investment, new
technology and new management methods to show a high level and growth in
productivity. It is assumed that the return on investment is so high that capital
productivity and total factor productivity increases.
The special consideration of the cost of unemployment and the loss of firm specific
human capital does not necessarily mean a fall in the profitability of the employee-
owned enterprise. This is the case if the employees accept lower wages as a trade-
off for higher employment. Thus, reluctance in cutting down employment might be
balanced by higher wage-flexibility (Nuti, 1995, p. 14 and Earle & Estrin, 1995,
p.12). Such a trade-off is most likely when employees have control of the company
and when they get the residual, i.e in the employee owned enterprise and to a lesser
degree in the case with management control. In other cases a more traditional wage-
earner attitude is expected.
A high level of factor productivity means that there is a large "cake" to divide among
the input factors. If the distribution between profit and wage is given, a high factor
productivity will result in a high gross return on total assets. Depending on the
capital-structure, the total pr fit will be divided between the equity capital and debt
capital and thus determine the net return on the equity capital. Bo h measures will
be used in the empirical analysis.
Access to capital is important for the deep restructuring of the enterprise. First, there
is the possibility of getting capital from internally generated resources, i.e. from the
net profit. It depends on the profitability and the owner's decision whether to pay
dividends or not. Therefore, in figure 5.2, the signs follows the signs for profitability
except for foreign owned-enterprises. The assumption is that the external owner at
some point will take out profit from the enterprise in the form of dividends as
payment for the initial and often large capital contribution. For the employee-owned
enterprise it depends to a high degree on the profit level which as discussed earlier
could vary. It also depends on the preferences of the employe s. A relatively high
risk aversion, preference for paid-out income, and the element of collective
ownership draws in the direction of low internal accumulation of profit. On the other
hand, the employees will also have an interest in securing their jobs and this might
make it necessary to inject additional money into the enterprise. In this way,
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reducing the risk of lay-off and loss of firm specific human capital y mean that the
employees actually invest extra money into the enterpris  (see Earle & Estrin, 1995,
p 50).
This argument can be taken a step further as an argument for mobilizing capital
contributions from the personal savings of the employees. Such "internal emissions"
are most likely when the employees have control and, thus, a better guarantee for
attempts to maintaining employment. Similarly for the other private ownership forms,
owners may attempt to attract additional capital from employees both to increase
capital, but also to improve the incentives for the employees.
As discussed earlier, loans from banks can be expected to be more difficult for
employee-owned enterprises to get compared to other private ownership types. The
bank can estimate an extra risk because of a low net worth (if this is the case) and
because of a fear that the employ es will follow objectives like increased wage and
stable employment as opposed to wealth maximization, see section 3.
Extra capital to the employee-owned enterprise in he form of capital emissions sold
to external owners will probably to a high degree depend on whether this is a
minority or majority shareholding for sale. A minority shareholder can be confronted
with the previously discussed situation where employee stakeholder interest
dominates their interests as shareholders, thereby implying a negative return to
shares and extra high returns to labour. The risk of such behavior may effectively
close this path to external capital for employee-owned enterprises. The problem to
a certain extent also concerns the management-controlled case and management
ownership. For outside-owned enterprises there should be no problem in getting
extra capital in this way. An emission of shares implying that an external owner
takes over the majority of shares is in principle possible in all cases - implying
privatization for a state-owned enterprise. However, it is not likely that this will
happen for a employee-owned enterprise unless an outsider can make a very good
offer to the inside owners or the company is in a serious financial crisis and
desperately needs extra capital.
As emphasized previously, investment is the crucial element for long run or deep
restructuring. Investments are necessary to adjust the production process to the
world market prices and to use the human resources in an efficient way. The
following elements are important for the level of investment: th  ownership structure
(specifcally in relation to the degree of collective ownership), the objectives and
degree of risk aversion of the owners, the quality of management, the profitability
of the enterprise and thus of the future investments and the accesto ext rnal capital.
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As earlier noted, we assume that the ownership is of the individual type although
with some element of collective ownership because of the limited tradeability of
employee shares. The more difficult it is for the employees to sell their shares and
get a capital gain as compensation for accumulated capital and improvements in the
performance of the enterprise the more pronounced will the socalled "horizon"
problem be. This problem was first raised by Furubotn & Pejovich (1970) and
Vanek (1971) and concerns the situation when the majority of employees expect to
leave the enterprise before a given investment has been fully depreciated. They will
only include the returns of the investment within this time horizon. Therefore, only
investments with relatively high returns or short time horizon will be made in the
collectively-owned enterprise. This means underinvestment compared to the
traditionally owned twin. Even if we have full individual ownership, higher risk
aversion of the employees combined with the risk concentration in insider-owned
enterprises points in the direction of lower investment. This might o a certain degree
be counterbalanced by the motive of cutting the risk of lay-offs through higher
investments. In figure 5.2 we predict that the combined effect of the specific
ownership-structure and the objectives of the employees will be a tendency, albeit
moderate, in the direction of relatively low investment. The main factor for this type
of ownership will probably be the limited access to external capital. 
For the management-controlled employee-owned enterprise, the risk aversion
problem will disappear, but the financing problem will continue to be important. For
the remaining private forms both objectives and access to capital point in the
direction of high investments. This is especially the case for foreign-owned
enterprises. State-owned enterprises are at the other end of the specter. To the extent
that they are waiting for privatization, managers may want to delay investments. This
is particularly the case if the manager himself has plans to take over the enterprise
since such investments might imply a higher privatization price. Access to capital is
also expected to be limited unless the state considers the specific enterprise to be of
strategical importance. In this case state loans or guarantees might mean very good
access to external capital - not showed at the figure.
Figure 5.2 does not include the cases where managers or the other employees own
a minority share. This is because the predictions for these cases are quite straight
forward. As described in the earlier section, this type of ownership means that the
basic problems concerning agency will be reduced. The motivation of managers and
other employees will increase and it could at the same time mean an extra source for
internal supply of capital. Therefore, this type of financial participation is expected
to improve the economic performance for nearly all the economic variables
mentioned in figure 5.2. Minority shareholdings by managers and other employees
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will be analyzed in the following empirical sections.
(a section on empirical results from countries in transition included here?)
6. Empirical analysis
6.1 Introduction and overview
This section presents a short summary of some of the preliminary results of the study
of economic performance of groups of enterprises with different ownership
structures. After a short introduction to the data sets used for the analysis of
economic performance a short description of the special starting conditions for
different groups is warranted. These starting conditions in combination with the
ownership structure determine the economic results. The restructuring of production
has immediate effects on the growth in sales and on the adjustment of employment
which will be analyzed in the following sections. The degree of efficiency in using
the resources will be analyzed in the following section on productivity. Given the
level of productivity, the wage level, analyzed in the next section, determines the
surplus and the profitability of the enterprise. Retained profits and external finance
are important for the possibility of deep restructuring in the form of investments.
This is discussed in the following sections.
Note, however, that the analysis is still not finished and that the results presented
here are only preliminary. The final analysis will be presented in a number of articles
by Jones and Mygind. These articles will include a more detailed and more  reliable
analysis than can be presented at this early stage of the research. 
The data sets used for the analysis of the economic performan e of employee owned
enterprises compared to other ownership types are as follows:
Estonia: A stratified random sample of 414 enterprises was surveyed about the
distribution of ownership in January 1995. This data set w s supplemented with 227
state owned enterprises and 25 foreign owned enterprises. This means that there in
total are 666 enterprises in the data set. For these enterprises we have financial data
for 1993 and 1994, and for a subset also specified information on wage-levels and
investment levels and sources for finance in 1994. 
Latvia: We have a total data set of 5 585 enterprises including summary information
on ownership group distributed on state, municipality, insiders, foreign and domestic
outsiders. This data set also includes information on employment and wage levels.
A sub-set of the large data set of 685 enterprises with 20 or more employees
28
includes a broad range of financial variables from 1994.
Lithuania: 357 large manufacturing enterprises included in the data base at the
statistical department were surveyed about the distribution of ownership i  July 1994
and again in July 1995. In the second round, 127 enterprises from construction and
trade were included. For these enterprises, we have financial data for some variables
dating back to 1992, but with the best coverage for 1994.
Figure 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 gives an overview over some of the main results for different
ownergroups in Estonia and Lithuania. The results will be commented in the
following sections.
Figure 6.1.1 Economic variables for  ownership groups in Estonia - averages
Owner groups State MinEO MinMO   EO   MO    OO FO ALL
Variable
assets/employee
1993 1000 EEK 97 214 48 36 73 24 40 62 35 76 168 52 457 77 136 541
1994 1000 EEK 119 211 73 43 100 27 46 78 48 79 245 81 401 81 151 600
employment 
growth 93-94 % -14.7 211 -11.6 44 9.4 27 0.7 78 14.8 79 -6.0 83 40.8 82 1.2 604
Average wage
1993 1000 EEK 14.0 214 14.4 37 15.7 24 11.6 62 10.9 77 15.8 54 25.3 78 15.1 546
1994 1000 EEK 21.0 211 21.0 44 21.8 27 16.8 78 15.7 79 24.9 84 34.4 82 22.2 605
Return on assets
1993  % 6.8 192 11.7 31 22.3 20 18.6 53 17.5 66 13.3 49 5.0 50 11.2 461
1994  % 0.4 213 13.5 43 17.3 27 19.0 76 21.6 78 9.7 81 8.4 81 9.4 599
Finance 1994 %
debt / assets 65 42 61 61 66 47 64 60
bankloans/ debt 15 31 36 35 29 28 28 25
debt / employee 69 31  62 15 31 115 236 85
bankloans /L 11 10 22 5 9 31 65 21
212-14 43 27 78 77-79 81 82 600-604
small numbers are the number of enterprises
6.2 Starting conditions
The institutional framework described in section 4 reveals that some of the early
starters in both Estonia and Latvia might have been in a rather favorable position. It
can be expected that insiders have taken over some of the best performing
enterprises in the first rounds of privatization. This might also have h ppened to a
certain extent in Lithuania. But unlike the two Northern countries, legislation
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gradually improved the positions of employees in Lithuania. Here, outsiders had in
fact the best opportunities in the early stage of privatization. 
Some of the privatized firms will formally appear as newly established enterprises.
This was the case for most of the enterprises taken over by leasing in Estonia and
Latvia. In the Estonian sample, the bulk of privatizations took place in 1993 and
1994, while most of the "direct established" enterprises started in 1991-1992. This
was the period when leasing and different forms of spin-offs were the most common
types of privatization. A new company was established as the legal entity, and this
entity then leased the assets of the state-owned company. In other cases, a group of
insiders - often the managers - by special contracts were able to transfer values from
state-owned enterprises to newly established private companies under their control.
Both cases are in fact privatization processes, but in the statistical information these
enterprises will be counted as de novo companies. This causes  important statistical
problems and we will therefore not present result disting ishing between privatized
and de novo enterprises. 
Figure 5.1.2 Average results for ownership groups in Lithuania.
main owner State State State Employ.ManagerOutsiderOutsiderOutsiderForeign total
insider % 0-5 5-25 25-50 50- 50- 0-5 5-25 25-50
assets/L
1993 ult. 6895 40 16946 25 42541 22 12915 51 11431 43 9134 25 9909 89 14379 70 23203 7 13615 372
1994 ult.  21082 42 51894 26 60785 24 25271 61 25673 53 28513 34 22177 94 27473 78 35528 7 28786 416
sales growth
1993-94  % 53 28 50 25 42 22 51 51 65 43 34 25 46 89 45 70 201 7 52 372
L-growth
1992-93  % -12 35 -11 20 -17 15 -10 37 -13 17 -18 23 -16 76 -10 49 -15 7 -13 279
1993-94  % -8 37 -7 24 -9 21 -9 47 -13 25 -14 25 -16 84 -11 63 -9 7 -12 331
1994-95  % -3 40 -14 25 -9 22 -4 51 6 43 -19 25 -17 89 -9 70 -8 7 -9 372
1995-95.7% -4 41 -5 26 -9 24 -2 61 -3 52 -13 34 -6 90 -2 78 -6 7 -5 413
1992-95.7% -22 36 -32 20 -40 15 -24 37 -38 18 -55 23 -45 76 -27 49 -29 7 -36 281
Labor-
productivity
1993  Litas 3776 36 5698 20 5567 16 6219 38 6392 23 4309 22 4586 83 5508 56 6629 7 5158 301
1994  Litas 5703 40 7723 23 9051 21 1147047 8853 39 5696 23 6598 83 6749 69 8326 7 8014 352
average wage
1992  Litas 64 36 63 22 68 15 72 42 65 19 81 23 65 83 70 52 74 7 68 299
1993  Litas 2040 37 2128 24 2651 21 2371 47 2651 25 2085 23 1956 84 2349 63 2649 7 2232 331
1994  Litas 3801 40 4214 25 5168 22 5021 51 5145 43 3545 25 3796 89 4347 70 5178 7 4342 372
dividends/L
1994  % 4 40 119 25 156 21 136 48 45 43 10 25 81 88 115 66 108 7 84 363
profitmargin
1992  % 15 37 26 24 22 21 22 47 21 25 24 23 26 84 24 63 25 7 23 331
1993  % 10 40 18 27 14 22 15 55 1 45 11 26 13 98 17 75 16 7 14 395
1994  % -1 42 4 26 4 24 10 61 4 53 1 34 -3 91 8 78 8 7 3 416
30
return on as-
sets 94 % 10 42 3 26 9 24 18 61 8 53 0 34 1 91 12 78 0 7 8 416
debt/assets 
1993 ult% 49 42 53 26 44 24 51 61 55 53 46 33 47 91 51 78 26 7 49 415
1994 ult% 30 42 27 26 24 24 33 61 36 53 38 34 38 91 32 78 37 7 34 416
bankloans/
debt
1993 ult% 28 41 23 26 27 24 17 61 20 53 20 33 23 91 24 76 28 7 23 412
1994 ult% 28 41 30 26 34 24 17 61 21 53 28 34 28 91 30 76 36 7 26 414
investment
per L 1994 494 40 1473 25 1497 22 964 51 826 43 1590 25 1186 89 1156 70 1950 7 1113 372
small numbers are the number of enterprises
It is difficult to uncover the initial position f he enterprise because often we do not
have any data about the performance prior to privatization. Furthermore, such  data
originate in a period when the economic changes were very fast, e.g. change in
currency, calculations methods, very high inflation etc. - all factors which make the
economic data less reliable. However, a few indicators are worth mentioning:
In Estonia, we have relativ ly few observations with information about profitability
before privatization, and we do not have any significant results indicating that
insiders took over the most profitable companies. The relation between choice of
ownership and the size of the company in terms of the number of employees is also
rather weak. There is no tendency for employee ownership to be more frequent in
smaller than in larger enterprises. As noted before, only management ownership is
significantly negatively related to the number of employees. For worker ownership
there is some indication of the opposite tendency.
There is a strong tendency that the degree of employee ownership increases with
lower capital per employee. In the one half of the enterprises with the lowest capital
per employee, managers own 24%, other employ es 31%, other Estonians 31%, the
state 3% and foreigners 10%. In the 10% of enterprises with the highest capital per
employee foreigners own 61% and insiders only 0,2%. The low capital pr employee
was especially typical for the early stages of privatization. Combined with legislative
support, this is the background for a high proportion of employee ownership in
enterprises privatized in 1990 and 1991.
The capital intensity was lowest for majority insider ownership and somewh t higher
for minority insider ownership, but still lower than for the remaining cat gories of
state and outside ownership. Foreign owned enterprises had the highest capital
intensity. The observations for capital intensity covers also the years after
privatization. But since this variable takes years to change, we assume that the
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tendency also covers the time before privatization. The main explanation behind the
tendency is probably that the employees have had the financial possibilities to take
over less capital intensive enterprises. Another explanation could be that the value
of the assets were deliberately made quite low especially in cases in which insiders
took over their company. As earlier explained this was included in the legislation in
the early stage of small privatization in Estonia, and this might also have been the
case in some of the early large privatizations. Since most measures for capital
intensity are made later, this explanation assumes that the assets s ill are entered into
the balance sheet with a low nominal value, and this need not be the case.
In Latvia, we cannot distinguish between management ownership and broad
employee ownership. As earlier mentioned, Latvia has a very high incidence of
insider ownership, especially for small enterprises. We do not have information
about the profitability before 1994, but there might have been a tendency for a
selection of the best part of enterprises by insiders. For capital intensity, like i
Estonia, the tendency is quite clear. Enterprises with majority foreign ownership
have the highest value of assets per employee, but state enterprises also have a high
capital intensity. This can be explained by the postponed privatization of large
capital intensive enterpris s in Latvia. For state and foreign-owned enterprises only
12% and 9% had total assess lower than 1 000 Lats, but 34% and 35% had assets
per employee higher than 5 000 Lats. For the remaining enterprises, owned by
insiders and domestic outsiders, 29-35% were in the lower end and only 12-17% in
the higher end of capital intensity. In a multi-variate analysis combining the effect
of different branches state and foreign-owned companies also have significantly
higher capital intensity.
In Lithuania, management ownership had a higher incidence in small enterprises, but
employee ownership were also quite frequent in large enterprises. There does not
seem to be a selection bias according t  profitability. Figures for profit margin from
1992 which, for most enterprises, was before privatization show that insider
ownership, measured in July 1995, had a profit margin below the average, see figure
5.1.2. The relation to capital intensity is not as clear in Estonia and Latvia. The
group with the highest assets per employee is state-dominated ownership with
insider ownership between 25%-50%. The insider-dominated groups hover around
the average despite the fact that there is a tendency for lower capital intensity
combined with lower size. In Lithuania, high capital intensity has not blocked take
overs by employees. The main explanation is the voucher privatization method for
large enterprises combined with the preferential price offered to employees before
the public offering of their enterprise.
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6.3 Performance after privatization - growth in sales.
We only have quantitative evidence from Lithuania for the increase in sales from
1993-94. The average increase for the 372 enterprises was 52% which, in fact,
indicates a fall measured in fixed prices since average inflation over the period was
70%. As  seen from figure 6.1.2 , foreign companies were performing the best, but
since only seven enterprises were included in this category this is not particularly
strong evidence. Management-dominated enterprises do well and their employee-
dominated counterparts perform around average. State-owned enterprises are close
to average, but with large variations among different groups. Outside-owned
enterprises perform poorer than the average. 
6.4 Adjustment of employment.
Estonia: In the analysis we distinguished between reductions and increa es in the
labor force. In a multi-variate analysis including independent variables of  sales,
wages, investment, ownership and control variab es it was found that state-owned
enterprises were significantly more reluctant to reduce the labor force. In a model
excluding wages the same was the case for majority employee-owned enterprises.
When wages were included in the model, falling wages substituted the adjustment
of employment and the effect from the ownership variable changed to be insignifi-
cant. A preliminary conclusion could be that employee-owned enterprises to a
certain extent used wages as a buffer instead of reducing employment. The results
for management dominated ownership are not significant. For the upward adjustment
of employment the results show a tendency to increase employment relatively more
in majority employee-owned enterprises. This contradicts theory but might be
explained by enterprises taking back some of the epl yees which had been laid off
in an earlier round. The same tendency is seen for management dominated ow ership
although this is not surprising seen from a theoretical point of view.
The average change in employment from 1993 to 1994 show that state-owned,
outside-owned and minority employee-owned enterprises had falling, majority
employee-owned enterprises had stable employment, enterprises with management
ownership had a 9-13% increase and foreign-owned had a 40% increase in
employment. 
Latvia: At given levels of sales and wages the multi-variate analysis shows lower
employment in insider-owned enterprises than in state-owned enterprises. This
means that up to 1994 the insider-owned companies have cut down employment
more than the state-owned enterprises.
Lithuania: The multi-variate nalysis shows higher levels of employment for given
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levels of value added and wages. When the employment for an earlier period is
included as an independent variable the results show that employee-dominated
enterprises have more sluggish adjustment of the labor force than is the case for
state-owned enterprises (Jones & Mygind, 1996a).
This tendency can also be seen for the simple averages shown in figure 5.1.1. The
fall in employment each year from 1992 to July 1995 and for the whole period is
smaller for employee-dominated ownership and around the average for managem nt-
dominated ownership. The outsider group has generally steeper fall in employment,
however, with a tendency for reduced falls when the degree of insider ownership
increases. This tendency is not found for state-owned enterprises which in most
cases have smaller falls than the average.
6.5 Productivity.
We have some evidence for all three countries for which preliminary results for the
production function analysis are reported in Jones & Mygind (1996a).
Estonia: In a Cobb-Douglas production function model including a vector of the
earlier mentioned ownership structures and a vector including control measures such
as branch and location it is found that state-owned companies have lower and
foreign and minority insider owned-enterprises higher factor productivity than the
omitted category of outside ownership. In another estimation, a higher degree of
employee  and management ownership turns out to give higher productivity. 
Latvia: A Cobb Douglas estimation based on net turnover shows that foreign and
insider ownership has a significantly higher level of sales with given inputs of capital
and labor compared to state-owned enterprises. 
Lithuania: The preliminary results based on the ownership variables from 1994
show significantly lower factor productivity for management-dominated enterprises,
and also for employee-owned, although not significantly. On the other hand, it is also
shown that a higher participation rate of managers in ownership improve
productivity.
For Lithuania we have also some averages for labor productivity based on the July
1995 ownership distribution which for different reasons are expected to be more
reliable. The results for 1993 and 1994 are shown in figure 6.1.2. Especially the
group with dominating employee ownership has high labor productivity, but also
management ownership shows above average results. Furthermore, there is a clear
tendency for higher productivity when the degree of insider ownership increases both
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in the group for state-dominated and outside-dominated ownership.
6.6 Wage-level.
Estonia: For Estonia we have detailed data-material about wages for 404 of the
enterprises in our data set. This is based on information about wages for different
occupational groups on October 1994. The results are shown in figure 6.6 for three
groups: 1) managers, 2) specialists and skilled workers, and 3) unskilled workers.
The numbers are weighted so that different proportions of gender do not affect the
results. Wage-levels for all three occupational groups are relatively low in state-
owned enterprises and in enterprises with majority insider ownership. Fo  ent rprises
with minority insider ownership, wages for workers and professionals are also quite
low, but her managers are higher. The highest wage level is found in enterprises
with minority management ownership. Note that this was also the group with the
highest factor productivity. There might be special factors influencing this group of
enterprises. Domestic and foreign outside ownership have also relatively high wage-
levels. 
Figure 6.6 Average hourly wages for three occupational groups in Estonia
In
In a multi-variate analysis controlling for branches and location the described
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tendency is confirmed with wages for managers and unskilled workers significantly
lower in majority insider owned enterprises.
Lithuania: The results for the average wage-level in different ownership groups in
1992-1994 are shown in figure 6.1.2. The results for 1992 and 1993 do not show any
clear tendencies except that foreign enterprises have the highest wage-level. This is
also the case for 1994, but here the insider dominated companies also have a
relatively high average wage level. There are clear tendencies both in the state-
owned and outside-owned enterprises indicating that a higher share owned by
employees means higher wages. There is no clear variation related to size, but
considerable variation between branches. Especially construction, but also trade,
have quite high average wages. In construction, with the highest wage level around
50% above the total average, employee-owned companies are still 20% and manage-
ment dominated companies still 15% above the average for the branch. In trade the
general tendency is somewhat broken with insider dominated groups 4-20% below
the average for the branch. We have not yet made a multi-variate analysis on these
relations.
For Lithuania, we also have variables showing dividends per employee. In case of
employee-dominated ownership this is another way of paying out income to
employees. Figure 6.1.2 includes results for dividends per employee in 1993 and
1994. On average, for all enterprises, dividends made up only 5.5% of wages in
1993 and 2% in 1994. For employee-dominated enterprises, they made up 7% and
3% in the two years. There is a clear tendency for higher dividends for enterprises
with dominating employee ownership or with minority insider ownership. This need
not indicate employees interest in taking out cash from the company. It might be
explained by employees using dividends for buying some of the remaining state-
owned shares. Worthwhile noting is the high level for dividends in foreign- owned
enterprises in 1993. This indicates an early repatriation of profit.
6.7 Profitability
If the employees pay out excessive wages the results will be low profitability of the
employee-owned company. We have results from all three countries:
Estonia: The preliminary results on return on total assets are ba d on a multivariate
model with controls for branch and location. For the 1993 data this model show
lower return in state owned enterprises, but no significant variation for the other
ownership types. For 1994 again state owned enterprises have lower return, but here
all enterprises with insider ownership have significantly higher return than the
omitted category with outside ownership, and the two categories with management
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ownership have the highest return on assets. The simple averages show the same
tendency. It is noteworthy that foreign ownership has a relatively low return on
assets, which might be explained by high capital intensity which has not yet paid off.
Latvia: The preliminary results in a multi-variate model controlled for branch,
number of employee, total assets and capital intensity indicate that both insider and
outside domestic ownership have significantly higher returns than state ownership,
and the highest return on assets is found in the category of 50-99% inside ownership.
Surprisingly, foreign ownership does not reveal results significantly different from
state-owned enterprises. The results of a imple distribution of return on assets on
different owner categories is shown in figure 6.7.
It is seen from the figure that insider-owned enterprises have a more favorable
distribution than other types. State-owned enterprises are the worst performers.
Figure 6.7  Return on assets distributed on type of ownership:
Majority
owned by:
/return on  
 assets
State Foreign Insider Insider Outside total
50-99,9% 100%
number of   121    55    59   288   159   682
enterprises
         - -10%    35% 29% 25% 25% 31% 29%
-10% - 0%    28% 31% 20% 15% 16% 19%
    0% - 10%    22% 16% 24% 23% 31% 24%
  10% - 25%    12% 16% 12% 18% 11% 15%
  25% -     3% 7% 19% 19% 13% 13%
 total   100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Lithuania: We have not yet made any eco ometric analysis on the Lithuanian data,
but we have averages both for profit-margin and return on total assets. Profit margin
is defined as operating surplus (not including financial revenues and cost) as a
percentage of turnover. The profit margin does not seem to vary much from the total
average for the insider-dominated enterprises in 1992 and 1993, see figure 6.1.2.
This indicates that there is no selection bias according to profitability. In 1994, the
employee owned enterprises seem to do significantly better than the other
enterprises. This is also the case for outside dominated enterprises with a high stake
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of employee ownership. The general fall in profit margin from 1992 to 1994 is
probably mainly explained by the depressed economy, but it might also be because
of changed statistical definitions. Return on assets is based on profits including
financial revenue and costs. For this measure of profitability employee- owned
enterprises aredoing quite well in 1994 in relation to all other owner groups. Also,
state-owned and outside-owned enterprises with high inside ownership is doing
better than average. Management owned enterprises are around average and the rest
below. 
6.8 Finance
The external loan capital supplied to an enterprise can be measured by the ratio of
debt to assets. However, an increase in this factor cannot only be explained by an
inflow of external capital for investment. The debt might be short term supplie
credits created because the enterprise has not been able to pay its obligations. Thus,
we both have to look at the debt asset ratio and the specific type of debt. This
includes an investigation of bank loans in percentage of total loans.
Estonia: The most direct information about finance for investment has been
collected in Estonia. The statistical department made a survey about investment and
the companies also were asked to specify the relative contributions from six sources:
internally generated funds, domestic private capital, finance from banks, foreign
capital, state funds and "other sources". Figure 5.8 present simple unweighted
averages for the relative contribution from these sources for 1994 for 256 enterprises
which were also included in the ownership sample.
Figure 6.8  Financial sources for investment in Estonia 1994. 
Owner group State MinEO MinMO   EO   MO    OO Foreign
Source of finance
ALL
Internal 86% 88% 62% 72% 76% 84% 64% 80%
Private 1% 4% 23% 8% 11% 2% 6% 5%
Bank 2% 6% 15% 12% 9% 10% 15% 7%
Foreign 1% 0% 0% 7% 0% 3% 8% 3%
State 7% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 7% 4%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
N enterprises  104    23    13    29    19     42     26 256   
The figure shows that the vast majority of funds for investment, around 80%, were
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generated internally. Note, that the figure shows averages and is not typical for
individual enterprises. In fact, 71% of all enterprises relied completely on internal
funds. Another 10% financed their investments fully with funds from just one of the
other sources. Only around 20% of the companies used mixed forms of financial
sources. It seems that companies with insider ownership use at least as much private
and bank capital as do the domestically outside owned companies. Thus, from these
results there is no indication that access to external finance for investments were
especially difficult for insider owned companies.
Looking at the total capital structure of the different groups of enterprises using
accounting data, see figure 6.1.1, we find that the debt asset ratio for majority insider
owned enterprises (61%-66%) is higher than for externally-owned enterprises (47%).
This is also the case for foreign and for state-owned enterprises. However, minority
employee-owned enterprises make an exemption with only 42%. The average
amount of bank loans as a percentage of total loans is generally higher for both
majority and minority insider-owned companies (29%-36%) compared to the total
average of 25%. State-owned companies has significantly lower bank loans with
only 15% and outside domestic and foreign enterprises have both 28% bank loans
out of total debt. Again, it seems that the theoretical prediction of problems for
insiders in getting bank loans has not been correct. However, if we change the
measures to loans-per-employee, the insider-owned enterprises appear with less
loans. This change is caused by the low capital intensity for insider ownership. In
fact, the majority insider-owned and minority employee-owned enterprises hav
much less debt and bank loans than the average for the whole group, see figure
6.1.1.
Debt asset ratio has also been investigated in a multi-variate analysis with capital
intensity and return on assets in the preceding periods as explanatory variables and
branch and location as control variables. This analysis confirms that insider
ownership, except the minority employee ownership type, has significantly higher
debt ratios than the omitted category of external ownership. Bank loans as 
percentage of total debt is significantly higher for all insider ownership types.
However, these results does not take into account the fact that debt and bank loans
still might be r latively low per employee in insider-owned enterprises because the
capital labor ratio is quite low.
Latvia: A multi-variate analysis with similar specifications as the one used in
Estonia shows that the debt ratio for insider-owned enterprises is significantly higher
than for the state-owned enterprises. The proportion of bank loans to total debt
seems to have a relatively weak connection to insider ownership. However, in
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another model it is shown that bank loans is significantly lower the more insiders
own. A comparison of the frequency of different debt levels distributed on the five
ownership groups show the same tendency. 58% of the state-owned and 61% of the
outside-owned nterprises have a debt ratio below 50%. For foreign and insider
ownership the number is 34-41%. Only 7% of the state-owned and 8% of the
outside-owned enterprises have a debt ratio higher than 100%. For foreign
ownership it is 24% and for insider ownership it is 14-19%. The frequency
distribution on bank loans as a proportion of t tal loans show that insider ownership
lies in the low end together with state owned-enterprises. Considering that insider-
owned enterprises had significantly lower capital intensity the  result is that  bank
loans per employee are quite low in insider owned enterprises.
For Lithuania, debt has been divided in long and short term debt. As seen from figure
6.1.2, the long term debt is generally very low for all enterprises. Insiders hover
around the average, but there is large variation among the enterprises. Short term
debt as a proportion of total assets is for all enterprises on average 49% at the start
of 1994 but falls to 34% at the end of 1994. Here again there is no tendency
distinguishing insider ownership from the rest. Financial liabilities - mainly bank
loans - in proportion to total debt are lower for insider-dominated enterprises
especially for employee ownership. This confirms the tendency that insider-owned
enterprises have more problems to get bank loans than other enterprises. 
6.9 Investment
As predicted in theory and as confirmed in the preceding section, employee-owned
enterprises have special problems in getting external finance. Furthermore, they
might have a higher preference for short-term increases in income. They might b
more risk averse and at the same time they concentrate risk in their own enterprise.
As pointed out in section 5, the result may be lower investment and thus lower
capability of restructuring the enterprise. 
Estonia: Data from the special investment survey is considered to be the most
reliable, but as a measure for gross investment we have also usd th  change in fixed
assets plus depreciation. A multi-variate analysis with total assets and number of
employees as explanatory variables and with control for branch and location shows
that foreign owned enterprises clearly have the highest investment level. For 1993,
it was more than four times larger than for the domestic outside- owned enterprises
of comparable size. For 1993, the picture is also clear for majority inside owned
enterprises with investment levels around double as high as the average domestic
outside owned enterprise. For 1994, it seems that the measuring stick, the domestic
outside-owned enterprises, increases their investment level. Therefore, th  results are
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not so clear. Still foreign-owned enterprises have relatively high investment levels,
for state owned enterprises the investment level is significantly lower. For the
different groups of insider ownership, however, no significant results are found. 
Latvia: A preliminary multi-variate analysis similar to the model used in Estonia
shows at the 10% significant level that insider-owned enterprises and foreign- ow ed
enterprises have higher investment than comparable state-owned enterprises. For
domestic outside-owned enterprises the parameter is lso positive in relation to state
ownership, but not significant.
 
Lithuania: We have results for investments in 1994 measured both in relation to
total assets and measured per employee, see figure 6.1.2. Both measures show that
insider-owned enterprises have slightly lower investment levels. Foreign and outside-
owned enterprises with low inside ownership have higher levels. Measured per
employee, state-owned enterprises with insider ownership also have high levels of
investment. There is a clear tendency for higher investment in enterprises with a
higher number of employees. Average investment per employee in enterprises with
20-99 employees was in 1994 586 Litas, in enterprises with more than 500
employees it was 1 782 Litas. This explains some of the low results for especially
management-dominated ownership with many small enterprises. But the general
picture is that insider ownership in Lithuania seems to be affected by lack of xternal
finance to a higher degree than it is the case for other types of ownership.
6.10 Overview over economic performance
To get an overview over the general tendencies it is necessary to understand the
relation between the different variables. Figure 6.10 provides an overview over the
preliminary results. It i  difficult to produce clear-cut generalizations in some fields
because of differences between countries and specific type  of ownership structures.
In Latvia, we have not been able to distinguish between employee and management
ownership. However, from the earlier described institutional background, from
difficulties in finding employee-owned enterprises for case studies and from some
of the characteristics of the enterprises, we assume that the bulk of the Latvian
insider-dominated enterprises are in fact owned or at least dominated by the
management group.
Concerning the starting conditions we found that management dominated enterprises
tended to be relatively small. This was not the case for broader mployee ownership.
For both types, in Estonia as well as Latvia, there was a tendency for low capital
intensity. This was not the case in Lithuania probably because of the favorable
conditions for employees to take over both large and capital i tensive enterprises.
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Although the institutional background should indicate that especially in Estonia and
Latvia the initial profit potential should be higher in insider-owned enterprises, our
data cannot confirm such a tendency for any of the three countries.
Figure 6.10Economic performance of employee ownership 
                 compared to other types, preliminary results.
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Preconditions
capital intensity EO low, MO low IO lower EO, MO = outside
size EO average, MO lowIO smaller MO smaller,
profitability no difference no information no difference
growth in sales MO higher
EO average
change in
employment
EO less reductions more reductions EO less reductions
EO and MO in IO MO average
higher increases
productivity MinIO higher IO higher Mo low
factor productivity factor productivity factor productivity, 
EO and MO averagethan state owned EO, MO, minIO high
laborproductivity 
wage level EO and MO lower EO and MO higher
MinMO higher MinIO higher
profitability EO and MO higher IO higher EO & Min EO higher,
MO average
finance
debt/assets EO and MO higher IO higher no difference
bankloans/debt EO and MO higher IO lower EO and MO lower
bankloans/employeeEO and MO lower IO lower EO and MO lower
investment EO and MO average IO higher than stateEO and MO lower
Insider ownership, IO, is divided in employee ownership, EO, and management ownership MO,
OO = outside ownership, MinIO = minority IO, MinMO = minority MO, MinEO = minority EO.
The success of restructuring can be measured on the ability of the enterprises to turn
around the initial fall in sales to new growth. At the current stage of our analysis we
have only empirical data from Lithuania on growth in sales from 1993 to 1994. The
results how that management ownership have a higher increase and employe
ownership the same increase as the average for all enterprises. 
For Lithuania there is some parallel to the development in employment in the same
period, although especially employee-owned enterprises following the theoretical
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predictions seem to be more sluggish in their downward adjustment of the labor
force. For reductions of the labor force this is also confirmed by the results from
Estonia, and the relatively high reductions in Latvia confirms the prediction that
management-dominated enterprises tend to have steeper downward adjustment of
the labor force. Surprising is the steeper increase of the labor force in the majority
employee-owned enterprises compared to other Estonian nterprises with increasing
employment.
The slower reduction in the labor force could result in lower productivity in
employee-owned enterprises. This is, however, not confirmed by the data. The factor
productivity for employee-owned enterprises is around average in Estonia, and for
Lithuania the results are not significant. Management ownership is also around
average in Estonia, it is higher for Latvia, but surprisingly lower for Lithuania. These
differences are difficult to explain at the current stage of our research. However, for
Lithuania the results on labor productivity show a high level for both employee and
management-dominated ownership and also for minority insider ownership. This
indicate that the positive effect from employee motivation and alignment of interests
seem to play the decisive role for the level of productivity. These effect are stronger
than the negative effect from the more sluggish reduction of the labor force.
The results on wage-levels do not show the same pattern between these countries.
In Estonia, the downward flexibility of wages seem to characterize employee- owned
enterprises. In connection with the sluggish downward adjustment of employment,
employee ownership means that lower wages are traded off for job security. In
Lithuania, the wage-level is higher for both employee and management ownership
and this is also the case for other ownership types w th a considerable minority of
employee shares. 
However, it seems that labor productivity in the Lithuanian cases have been high
enough to give room for these relatively high wages. Wages have not been
excesive, thus eroding the profitability of the enterprises. In fact, profitability
measured as operating profits on turnover and by net profits on total assets show a
relatively high level for employee-owned enterprises in Lithuania. For enterprises
with a considerable employee minority share profit bility is also on a relatively high
level, and for management ownership it is around the verage for all enterprises. For
Estonia, both employee and management owned enterprises have above average
profitability and this is also the case for insider-owned enterprises in Latvia. It is
worth noting that profitability of insider-owned enterprises are higher than domestic
outside-owned enterprises and more remarkable also higher than for foreign-owned
enterprises. 
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The analysis of the financial structure of different groups of ente prises show that the
debt to total asset is higher for insider-owned enterprises both in Estonia and Latvia
and around average in Lithuania. For this group of enterprises, the value of bank
loans measured in relation to total debt is also relatively high in Estonia, but in the
other countries they are relatively low. When taking into consideration the low
capital intensity the picture also changes for Estonia, and for all three countries the
general result is that the value of bank loans per employee is relatively low for all
groups with insider ownership. These enterprises will have to rely on internally
generated capital for investment. In fact, the evidence from Estonia shows that for
all enterprises in general 80% of the investments are financed internally.
The results for investment point, in the case of Estonia, in the direction that both
employee-owned and management-owned enterprises have an around average
investment level. This is also the case in Latvia for the insider-dominated nterprises.
However, for Lithuania our preliminary results point in the direction of lower
investment both for management and employee-dominated enterprises. A
explanation behind the Lithuanian results might either be th  lack of external finance
or lower willingness to invest. Further analysis of the data shall try to go deeper into
these questions.
7. Conclusion (to be extended)
The analysis of economic performance have still only preliminary results. However,
in spite of some variation in the results we can conclude that there is no indication
that employee ownership means worse economic performance than for comparable
enterprises in the private sector. There is also no evidence for the often cited
conclusion that insider take-over is only “a half way privatization” including many
of the defects from the former system. Employee owned enterprises might be a little
more sluggish in the downward adjustment of employment, but productivity and
profitability seems often to be better than for most other enterprises. This indicates
that production have been restructured at least as much as in other enterprises, and
products and production methods have been adjusted to meet the new conditions
both on the cost and revenue side. Deep restructuring in the form of investment is
around the average, but here especially employee owned enterprises might meet a
problem of lack of finance from banks.
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